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[ COMMENTS I
Sterilization of the Mentally Disabled in
Pennsylvania: Three Generations Without
Legislative Guidance are Enough
They did not die out, for they are the past masters of the
survival arts. But do not look for them floating loose in the sea;
they gave up that cavalier freedom long ago. Now they swarm
in huge colonies, safe inside gigantic lumbering robots, sealed
off from the outside world, communicating with it by torturous
indirect routes, manipulating it by remote control. They are in
you and me; they created us, body and mind, and their preser-
vation is the ultimate rationale for our existence. They have
come a long way, those replicators. Now they go by the name of
genes, and we are their survival machines.1
I. Introduction
Dawkins' dark depiction of genes as the controllers and humans
as the controlled2 at once reveals man's need and justification for
exerting control over his environment whenever possible. Perhaps no-
where in the law has this need to control found a more neurotic ex-
pression than in the eugenic statutes of the early 1900's.1 Many of
I. R. DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976).
2. Dawkins' book was not written to comment on eugenic sterilization but instead to
propound the theory that human evolution could be explained by merely acting as if genes
were controlling human development and behavior.
3. Act of April 26, 1909, 1909 Cal. Stats. ch. 720 (first California sterilization statute);
Act of June 13, 1913, 1913 Cal. Stats. ch. 363 (second California statute); Act of August 12,
1909, 1909 Conn. Pub. Acts ch. 209; Act of April 28, 1923, 1923 Del. Laws ch. 62; Act of
March 13, 1925, 1925 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 194; Act of March 9, 1907 Ind. Acts ch. 215; Act
of April 10, 1911, 1911 Iowa Acts ch. 129 (first Iowa sterilization statute); Act of April 19,
1913, 1913 Iowa Acts ch. 187 (second Iowa statute); Act of April 16, 1915, 1915 Iowa Act ch.
202 (third Iowa statute); Act of March 14, 1913, 1913 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 305 (first Kansas
sterilization statute); Act of March 13, 1917, 1917 Kan Sess. Laws ch. 299 (second Kansas
statute); Act of April II, 19125, 1925 Me. Acts ch. 208; Act of April 1, 1913, 1913 Mich.
Pub. Acts No. 34 (first Michigan sterilization statute); Act of May 25, 1923, 1923 Mich. Pub.
Acts No. 285 (second Michigan sterilization statute); Act of April 8, 1925, 1925 Minn. Laws
ch. 154; Act of March 15, 1923, 1923 Mont. Laws ch. 164; Act of July 8, 1915, 1915 Neb.
Laws ch. 237; Act of March 17, 1911, 1911 Nev. Stats. s.28; Act of April 18, 1917, 1917
N.H. Laws ch. 181; Act of April 21, 1911, 1911 N.J. Laws ch. 190; Act of April 16, 1912,
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these statutes provided that the state could order the sterilization of
the "generally unfit," ranging from those persons with low IQs' to
those whose only "genetic defect" was that they were poor, deaf or
blind.8
Current law on the sterilization of the mentally disabled" is a
mixed assortment of antiquated statutes,7 a growing minority of
well-planned and even enlightened statutes,8 and varying judicial
standards.9 A number of states, Pennsylvania among them, have
1912 N.Y. Laws ch. 445; Act of March 13, 1913, 1913 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 56: Act of Feb.
191, 1917, 1917 Or. Laws ch. 279 (first Oregon sterilization statute); Act of Feb. 24, 1923,
1923 Or. Laws ch. 194 (second Oregon statute): Act of March 8. 1917, 1917 S.D. Sess. Laws
ch. 236: Act of March 16, 1925, 1925 Utah Laws ch. 82: Act of March 20, 1924, 1924 Va.
Acts ch. 394; Act of March 22, 1909, 1909 Wash. Laws ch. 249, s.35 (first Washington sterili-
zation statute); Act of March 8, 1921, 1921 Wash. Laws ch. 53 (second Washington statute):
Act of July 30, 1913, 1913 Wis. Laws ch. 693, as cited in Cynkar, Felt Necessities v. Funda-
mental Values? 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1418, 1433 n.76 (1981).
4. Under the Stanford Revision of the Binet-Simon intelligence test the scale for classi-
fying one's intelligence quotient (I.Q.) is as follows:
140 and above ....................... G EN IUS
120-139 ............................ VERY SU PERIO R
110-119 ............................ SU PER IO R
90-109 ............... ............. A V ERAG E
80-89 .............................. DU LL NO RM A L
70-79 .............................. BORDERLINE DEFECTIVE
50-69 ................... .......... M O RO N
25-49 .............................. IM B EC IL E
24 or less ........................... ID IO T
See A. ANASTASI. PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 208 (1962).
5. At the height of the eugenics movement, its advocates released periodic reports listing
those persons they considered to be "fit for sterilization." One report included the following:
The socially inadequate classes, regardless of etiology or prognosis, are the
following: 1) feeble-minded; 2) insane (including the psychopathic); 3) criminal-
ist (including the delinquent and wayward); 4) epileptic; 5) inebriate (including
drug-habitues): 6) diseased (including the tuberculous, the syphilitic, the lep-
rous, and others with chronic, infectious and legally segregable diseases): 7)
blind (including those with seriously impaired vision); 8) deaf (including those
with seriously impaired hearing); 9) deformed (including the crippled); and 10)
dependent (including orphans, ne'er-do-wells, the homeless, tramps and
paupers).
H. LAUGHLIN. THE LEGAL STATUS OF EUGENICAL STERILIZATION 65 (1929).
6. The author prefers to use the terms "mentally handicapped" or "mentally disabled"
instead of the terms "retarded" or "mentally incompetent" for the following reasons: I) the
former terms do not carry the same connotation of inferiority as do the others: and 2) the
terms are no less descriptive or accurate than the others. To this extent, they will be used to
the exclusion of others except where use of another term is necessary for citation, quotation or
stylistic purposes.
7. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.92-100 (1977).
8. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 436.010 to .150 (1973).
9. See generally R.K. Sherlock and R.D. Sherlock, Sterilizing the Retarded: Constitu-
tional, Statutory and Policy Alternatives, 60 N.C.L. REV. 943, 963-73 (1981-82) [hereinafter
Sherlock]; compare In re Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. 553, 450 A.2d 1376 (1982) (court stated
that there must be "clear and convincing" evidence that sterilization would be in the best
interests of the incompetent) with In re D.D., 64 A.D. 2d 898, 408 N.Y.S. 104 (1978) (court
has no jurisdiction to order sterilization absent specific statutory authority).
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never had a statute prescribing the circumstances under which a
mentally handicapped person could be involuntarily sterilized,
thereby leaving the determination entirely to the courts. 10
This Comment addresses the inherent inadequacies of leaving
the sterilization decision solely to the judiciary. It also traces the rise
and eventual decline of eugenics as a rationale for sterilization of the
mentally disabled. Further, this Comment explores the constitutional
considerations that attend any compulsory sterilization decision. Fi-
nally, it suggests that Pennsylvania, with a view toward protecting
the rights of the mentally handicapped, adopt the proposed statute
set forth at the end of this Comment.
II. Historical Analysis
A. Philosophical and Scientific Origins
The idea of bettering the human race through selective breed-
ing" is not a new one. Plato was the first important historical figure
to advocate the theory of improving mankind by choosing the correct
mate.' 2 This approach, known as positive eugenics,' 8 sought to im-
prove mankind by promoting the reproduction of "socially desirable"
genes. Eugenic sterilization statutes, however, are based on negative
eugenics. Negative eugenics"' attempts to improve society by se-
verely limiting or totally eliminating the reproduction of "socially
undesirable" genes.
Derived from the Greek word meaning "well born," the term
eugenics was coined by Sir Francis Galton'6 in 1883 who defined it
as "the study of agencies under social control that may improve or
10. Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico and Wyoming have never
had a compulsory sterilization statute.
II. The aim of selective breeding is to maximize the number of "good genes" that might
occur in any potential future offspring with the immediate result being a stronger, healthier,
more intelligent human being and the ultimate result being a stronger, healthier, more intelli-
gent human race.
12. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, (Universal Classics ed. 1901) (n.p.n.d.).
13. See E. Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit: Is Sterilization the Answer? 27 OHIo ST. L.J.
591 (1966) [hereinafter Ferster].
14. Id.
15. Before beginning the eugenics movement, Galton conducted research on the family
trees of famous English individuals and subsequently, he changed his focus to the "nature v.
nurture" controversy, specifically concentrating on the concordance rates of twins. Concor-
dance studies attempt to measure the extent to which the environment alters the emotional and
mental development of identical twins. Galton's work, in addition to that of Charles Darwin
and Gregor Mendel, led him to conclude that virtually all physical and psychological traits
were inherited, and thus provided the moral and scientific underpinnings of the eugenics move-
ment. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
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impair . . . future generations either physically or mentally."' 6 Sim-
ply stated, if mental disability was inherited, then sterilizing men-
tally disabled people was the solution. Galton and his followers, con-
vinced that the best way to improve society was to keep mentally
disabled people from reproducing, searched for a scientific basis for
their cause. They eventually seized upon both Darwin's theory of
evolution 17 and Mendel's recently re-discovered work on genetics'8 to
provide the scientific validation their theory needed in order to gain
both popular and legislative acceptance.
In Pennsylvania this acceptance took the form of a statute for
the "prevention of idiocy."' 9 Pennsylvania was the first state to gain
legislative approval of a eugenic sterilization statute,20 although it
was later vetoed and never succeeded in becoming law. 2' A similar
16. DEUTSCH. THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 357-58 (2d ed. 1949).
17. Charles Darwin, who happened to be Galton's cousin, pioneered work on the origin
of species that not only revolutionized the course of scientific thought in the latter part of the
nineteenth century, but also greatly influenced social thought. Darwin's notions of "natural
selection" and "survival of the fittest" exposed the significant interplay that exists between
scientific reasoning and social paradigms.
The concept of natural selection, today accepted as biological fact, contends that the rig-
ors of the environment determine which genes will be passed on to future generations and
which ones will eventually be purged from the gene pool. One manifestation of this process is
the different body types that predominate in the various climates throughout the world. For
example, Eskimos are generally shorter and have more compact bodies than do the inhabitants
of tropical climates. Natural selection proposes that this has occurred because.a more compact
body type has less surface area per unit volume than does a thin lanky body type. Thus, the
former body type is more heat efficient and persons with that body type in cold climates will
tend to, over time (as measured in tens of thousands of years), survive longer and more often.
This will result in more individuals of that particular body type reaching reproductive age,
thereby providing the opportunity for the passage of these genes to successive generations. In
this way, nature has selected who will live and who will die, with only the "fittest surviving."
See generally C. DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF THE SPECIES (1897) reprinted in P. APPELMAN.
DARWIN (2d ed. 1979).
18. At about the same time Galton was researching the family trees of famous English
individuals in the 1860's, an Austrian monk named Gregor Mendel was studying genetics by
crossbreeding peas. Mendel's work was entirely forgotten until the turn of the century, but
apparently emerged just in time to convince Galton of the veracity of the scientific basis for his
eugenics movement. Based on his classification of genes (then called "determiners") as either
dominant or recessive, Mendel developed a system of ratios for predicting the probability that
a particular trait would appear in any future generation of pea plants. He then postulated that
this system would also work for physical traits in humans. Galton took this extrapolation one
step further by saying that psychological, mental and emotional traits were similarly deter-
mined. It was this ill-conceived gap of logic that ultimately eroded the scientific basis for
eugenic sterilization. ILTIS, GENETICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 25-34 (1951).
19. This act required that "each and every institution ... entrusted . . . with the care
of idiots . . . [should] appoint a neurologist and a surgeon ...to examine the mental and
physical condition of the inmates ... [and if in their opinion sterilization was warranted,
should] perform such operation for the prevention of procreation. ... Chellener, The Law
of Sexual Sterilization in Pennsylvania, 57 DICK. L. REV. 298 (1953).
20. Id.
21. Governor Pennypacker's veto was returned with the following terse letter:
This bill has what may be called with propriety an attractive title. If idiocy
could be prevented by an Act of Assembly, we may be quite sure that such an
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statute did succeed in becoming law two years later in Indiana, 22
paving the way for twenty-one other states to follow suit within the
next 20 years.23 Yet judicial acceptance of eugenic sterilization law
was slow to emerge. Prior to 1925, the courts invalidated all sterili-
zation laws they encountered, claiming that the laws violated equal
protection.24
This trend came to an abrupt end in 1927 when the United
States Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell 5 held that a Virginia eugenic
sterilization statute was not violative of equal protection. A close
analysis of Justice Holmes' reasoning in that case will provide a use-
ful framework for considering current sterilization law.
B. Buck v. Bell
Carrie Buck was an eighteen-year-old woman who had been
committed to the Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble-
minded.26 Her mother and daughter were both mentally retarded.
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld a petition for sterili-
zation of Carrie, and in doing so, gave credence to the Virginia com-
pulsory sterilization statute.2 7 The Virginia legislature in enacting
act would have been passed and approved in this state. What is the nature of the
operation is not described, but it is such an operation as they shall decide to be
'safest and most effective.' It is plain that the safest and most effective method
of preventing procreation would be to cut the heads off the inmates, and such
authority is given by the bill to this staff of scientific experts . . . . The bill is,
furthermore, illogical in its thought . . . . A great objection is that the bill...
would be the beginning of experimentation upon living human beings, leading
logically to results which can be readily forecasted, The chief physician . . . has
candidly told us . . . that 'Studies in heredity tend to emphasize the wisdom of
those ancient people who taught that the healthful development of the individual
and the elimination of the weakling was the truest patriotism-springing from
an abiding sense of the fulfillment of a duty to the state ....
See Ferster supra note 13, at 593.
22. Id. at 593 n.10.
23. Those states were California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin.
24. Haynes v. Lapeer, 201 Mich. 138, 166 N.W. 938 (1918); Smith v. Bd. of Examin-
ers, 85 N.J.L. 46, 88 A. 963 (Sup. Ct. 1913); Osborn v. Thomson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N.Y.S.
638 aff'd mer., 185 App. Div. 902, 171 N.Y.S. 1094 (1918).
25. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
26. This institution was one of five named under the Virginia Act. See infra note 27.
27. The Virginia Sterilization Act, 1924 Va. Acts 569-71 (repealed 1968), provided:
Whereas, both the health of the individual patient and the welfare of soci-
ety may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of mental defectives
under careful safeguard and by competent and conscientious authority, and
Whereas, such sterilization may be effected by the operation of vasectomy
in males and in females by the operation of salpingectomy, both of which said
operations may be performed without serious pain or substantial danger to the
life of the patient, and
Whereas, the Commonwealth has in custodial care and is supporting in va-
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this statute, asserted that both the health of the patient and the wel-
fare of society would be promoted by sterilization performed pursu-
ant to this statute. The patient would benefit by avoiding
pregnancies that she did not want nor was capable of understand-
28whlscibeeiing, while society would benefit by the decrease in the number of
rious state institutions many defective persons who if now discharged or paroled
would likely become by the propagation of their kind a menace to society but
who if incapable of procreating might properly and safely be discharged or pa-
roled and become self-supporting with benefit both to themselves and to society,
and
Whereas, human experience has demonstrated that heredity plays an impor-
tant part in the transmission of insanity, idiocy, imbecility, epilepsy and crime,
now, therefore
1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia, That whenever the
Superintendent of the Western State Hospital, or of the Eastern State Hospital,
or of the Southwestern State Hospital, or of the Central State Hospital, or of the
State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble-minded, be of the opinion that it would
be in the best interest of the patients and of society that any inmate of the
institution under his care should be sexually sterilized, such superintendent
should perform, or cause to be performed by some capable physician or surgeon,
the operation of sterilization on any such patient in any such institution afflicted
with hereditary forms of insanity that are recurrent, idiocy, imbecility, feeble-
mindedness or epilepsy; provided that such superintendent shall have first com-
plied with the requirements of this Act.
2. Such superintendent shall first present to the special board of directors
a petition stating the facts of the case and the grounds of his opinion, verified by
his affidavit to the best of his belief, and praying that an order may be entered
by said board requiring him to perform or have performed by some competent
physician to be designated by him in his said petition or by said board in its
orders upon the inmate of his institution named in such petition, the operation of
vasectomy if upon a male and of salpingectomy if upon a female.
The said board may deny the prayer of the said petition or if the said spe-
cial board shall find that the said inmate is insane, idiotic, imbecilic, feeble-
minded or epileptic and by the laws of heredity is the probable potential parent
of socially inadequate offspring likewise afflicted, that the said inmate may be
sexually sterilized without detriment to his or her general health, and that the
welfare of said inmate and of society will be promoted by such sterilization, the
said special board may order the said superintendent to perform or to have per-
formed by some competent physician to be named in such order upon the said
inmate, after not less than thirty days from the date of such order, the operation
of vasectomy if a male or of salpingectomy if female; provided that nothing in
this Act shall be construed to authorize the operation of castration not the re-
moval of sound organs from the body.
L. Burgdorf and P. Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch is Almost Dead. Buck v. Bell and the Steril-
ization of Handicapped People, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 995, 1001 n.51 (1976-77) [hereinafter
Burgdorf].
28. In the author's opinion, there are valid reasons for providing for the sterilization of
certain mentally disabled persons when circumstances dictate that it would be in the best
interests of that person. Consider the following example reported in the medical literature:
A -14 year old" girl, the youngest of ten children, was a premature baby with
trisomy 21 Downs Syndrome complicated by pneumococcal meningitis when she
was five months old, and severe myopia. She was known to the Comprehensive
Care Unit from birth, and serial psychological testing showed an IQ of 30 with
minimal speech development. At age 7 /, goiter was observed with hyperthy-
roidism, at age ten thelarche, at 10 1/, menarche with heavy flow. During men-
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mental defectives that it would have to accommodate.
Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes enunciated the various
procedures that must be followed in order to safeguard the interests
of the patient.29 These procedural safeguards, however, did not rem-
edy the substantive defect of eugenic sterilization law. This funda-
mental defect lies in the erroneous assumption that heredity is the
primary cause of mental retardation."0 Holmes further reasoned that
Carrie Buck is the "probable potential parent of socially inadequate
offspring"'" and thus, the Court could not say that as a matter of
law the decision to sterilize her was an irrational one. Stating that
"[tihe principle which sustains compulsory vaccinations is broad
enough to cover cutting the fallopian tubes," '32 Holmes' approach
was one of "better now than later." This approach is best revealed
by the following passage in which Holmes declared that:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may
call upon its best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it
could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the
state for their lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those
concerned, in order to prevent our society from being swamped
with incompetence. It is better for all the world if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or let them
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind . . . three genera-
ses she became frightened and withdrawn, refusing to eat and going to bed or
hiding under the bed. She did not understand repeated explanation of menses by
her mother, could not cope with menstrual hygiene, and had to be kept home
from school during menstrual periods. The patient had a total abdominal hyster-
ectomy under general anesthesia at age 11 . . . . In the three years after sur-
gery, she was reported to have a happier personality at home with no episodes of
withdrawal, and she did not miss school. There was no history of sexual activity
or molestation.
Sherlock, supra note 9, at 952 n.53.
29. These procedures allowed a superintendent to bring a sterilization petition to the
special board of the hospital or colony where the patient was committed. The petition had to
be verified by affidavit. Both the patient and the patient's guardian were to receive notice of
the petition and of the time and place of the hearing. If there was no guardian, then the
superintendent was to apply to the circuit court of the county to appoint one. If the patient was
a minor, then notice had to also be served on the patient's parents. Ultimately, the board was
required to rule either for or against the operation. The Virginia statute also allowed for ap-
peal to the circuit court of the county, and finally to the supreme court of appeals. 274 U.S. at
206-07.
30. Many studies were conducted in the years following Buck which revealed that there
was no scientific or statistical evidence to support the belief that the mental deficiencies the
sterilization statutes were attempting to eradicate were inherited. See DEUTSCH. THE MEN-
TALLY ILL IN AMERICA, 354-86 (2d ed. 1949).
31. 274 U.S. at 207.
32. Id.
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tions of imbeciles are enough.3"
In disposing of the equal protection claim, Holmes asserted that "the
law does all that is needed when it does all that it can,"13  indicating
that as long as there was a constant flow of patients going through
the asylum, all mentally retarded persons were potentially within the
ambit of the sterilization law. Thus, all mentally impaired persons
within the state were equally protected. 5
Although Buck has never been expressly overruled, it has been
the subject of widespread and severe criticism. 36 One commentator
stated that "the opinion is noteworthy for the boldness with which
Justice Holmes dispenses with logic and in short, pithy sentences
agrees to the subordination of human rights to the supposed expedi-
ency of a long-range racial improvement."3 " While this sentiment
aptly characterizes the prevailing view of eugenic sterilization,
eugenics as a basis for sterilization of mentally handicapped persons
still pervades much of the current legislation on the issue.3 8
Although states with compulsory sterilization statutes are in the
minority,39 those states holding that a court can not rule on a sterili-
zation petition absent specific statutory authority are in the major-
ity.40 A review of the current status of compulsory sterilization law
33. Id.
34. Id. at 208.
35. Id.
36. Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., Director of Training and Technical Assistance of the Devel-
opmental Disabilities Law Project at the University of Maryland, together with Marcia Pearce
Burgdorf, co-director of the Developmental Disabilities Law Project and Assistant Professor of
Law at the University of Maryland, co-wrote a scathing review of the Buck decision, making
an overt analogy to the sterilization practices under Hitler's Third Reich. The Burgdorfs note
that as recently as 1969 the following law was on the books in Connecticut:
Every man who shall carnally know any female under the age of fourty-five
years who is epileptic, imbecile, feeble-minded or a pauper, shall be imprisoned
in the state prison not less than three years. Every man who is epileptic who
shall carnally know any female under the age of fourty-five years, and every
female under the age of fourty-five years who shall consent to be carnally known
by any man who is epileptic, imbecilic or feeble-minded, shall be imprisoned in
the State prison not less than three years.
1895 Conn. Pub. Acts 667 (repealed 1969). See Burgdorf supra note 27, at 998 n.24. See, e.g.,
W. WOLFENSBERGER, THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF OUR INSTITUTIONAL MODELS, 33-39
(1975).
37. Gest, Eugenic Sterilization: Justice Holmes v. Natural Law, 23 TEMP. L.Q. 306
(1950).
38. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 5701-05 (1974); MISS. CODE ANN. 41-45-1 to 19
(1972). The approach of many current statutes is virtually unchanged since the time of Justice
Holmes in Buck v. Bell. South Carolina's sexual sterilization statute provides for the compul-
sory sterilization of "any inmate of an institution who is inflicted with any hereditary form of
insanity that is recurrent, idiocy, imbecility, feeble-mindedness or epilepsy . S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 44-47-10 to 74-100 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
39. See infra note 41.
40. See Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub. nom. Stump v.
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throughout the United States places Pennsylvania's position on com-
pulsory sterilization in its proper perspective.
III. Current Sterilization Law
A. States with Sterilization Statutes - Various Statutory
Rationales
Currently, there are thirteen states that have compulsory sterili-
zation statutes."1 This total is significantly less than it was twenty
years ago when half of the states had such statutes.' Among the
states that have retained their sterilization laws, there remains great
variance among the different rationales that underlie the statutes,
the procedures the statutes employ, and the classes of persons to
whom the statutes apply. For example, both Washington"3 and Dela-
ware" sanction sterilization of "habitual criminals" under certain
circumstances, while South Carolina 45 has come the closest to ad-
dressing both criminals and mentally disabled persons under one
law. The South Carolina statute provides that the superintendent of
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (the specific issue at the Supreme Court level concerned
judicial immunity); Wade v. Bethesda, 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 469 So.2d 588 (Alabama 1985); Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So.2d 310 (Alabama
1979); In re Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1964); Maxon v. Superior Court,
135 Cal. App. 3d 626, 185 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1982); In re Tulley, 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 266 (1978); In re S.C.E., 378 A.2d 144 (Del. Ch. 1977); A.L. v. G.R.H., 163 Ind. App.
636, 325 N.E.2d 501 (1975); Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1968); Smith v. Com-
mand, 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140 (1925); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974); In
re Matter of D.D., 64 A.D,2d 898, 408 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1978); Application of A.D., 90 Misc.2d
236, 394 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1977); Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). See
also In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976).
41. See ALA. CODE §§ 22-8-1 to -8 (1971); ARK. STAT. ANN. 59-501 (1972); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, §§ 5701-5705 (1974); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-931 to -936 (1975); IDAHO CODE §§
39-3901 to -3910 (1977); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-1 to -19 (1972); N.C. STAT. §§ 35-36 to -
50. (1976); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 436.010 to .150 (1973); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-47-10 to 47-100
(Law Co-op. 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 64-10-1 to -10-13 (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, §§ 8701-8704 (1977); VA. CODE §§ 54-352.9-.15 (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.92-
100 (1961).
42. Those states were Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
West Virginia and Wisconsin. Ferster, supra note 13, at 596 n.30.
43. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.92-100 (1961) provides that "[whenever any person
shall be adjudged guilty of carnal abuse of a female person under the age of ten years, or of
rape, or shall be adjudged to be a habitual criminal, the court may, in addition to such other
punishment or confinement as may be imposed, direct an operation to be performed on such
person, for the prevention of procreation."
44. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 5701-5705 (1974) provides that "[all habitual criminals
or confined criminals who have been convicted of at least three felonies . are candidates
for sterilization.
45. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-47-10 to -47-100 (Law Co-op. 1977).
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any "penal or charitable""' institution is to be the judge of a particu-
lar person's "competency" when deciding whether to bring a sterili-
zation petition. 7
The eugenic rationale having fallen into disfavor, those states
which felt the need to retain their compulsory sterilization statutes
sought different grounds upon which to base the laws. Today, the
two most prevalent rationales are the punitive and the therapeutic.
Many of these statutes, however, still cling to their eugenic origins.
1. The Punitive Rationale.-As previously mentioned, both
Washington and Delaware have punitive rationales for their sterili-
zation statutes, 48 yet both of these laws still apply to mentally handi-
capped persons to the extent that there is an overlapping between
mentally impaired persons and criminals. The punitive rationale for
compulsory sterilization is predicated on the assumption that violent
propensities in criminals are genetically determined. 4" This assump-
tion extends the eugenic basis for sterilization to include convicted
criminals. It follows that the arguments which undercut eugenics as
a rationale for the compulsory sterilization of mentally disabled per-
sons would fare equally well against statutes aimed at sterilizing
criminals. To a large degree, this is true and accounts for the fact
that only two states still have punitive sterilization statutes. 50
In the early 1960's, scientific research on the genetically abnor-
mal "XYY" male5" provided an empirical basis for the punitive ra-
46. Id. South Carolina was the first state to expressly combine punitive and eugenic
rationales for sexual sterilization. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
47. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-47-10 to -47-100 (Law Co-op. 1977). Many eugenic steriliza-
tion statutes permitted the superintendent of the hospital or colony where the mentally handi-
capped person was committed to order the sterilization. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-1
to -19 (1972).
48. See supra notes 43 and 44 and accompanying text.
49. For an excellent discussion of this proposition and its relevance to the criminal jus-
tice system, see L. Taylor, Genetically-Influenced Antisocial Conduct and the Criminal Jus-
tice System 31 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 31 (1982) [hereinafter Taylor].
50. See supra notes 43-4 and accompanying text.
51. Lawrence E. Taylor, Associate Professor at the Gonzaga University School of Law
describes the creation of an XYY male as follows:
The XYY studies test for variations in the number and/or sexual character-
istics of the chromosomes. Every person normally carries fourty-six chromo-
somes in every cell of his body, arranged in twenty-three pairs. Of these twenty-
three pairs, twenty-two are "autosomes" or genes, which contain most of the
individual's biological characteristics. The remaining pair of genes are called
"gonosomes" which determine such remaining traits as primary sexual charac-
teristics. In women, these paired sex chromosomes are called "X" chromosomes-
in men, the gonosomes are represented by one of the X chromosomes paired with
a much smaller "Y" chromosome. These are referred to by geneticists as the XX
or XY gonosomes respectively, and their presence in a fetus determines, among
other things, whether the child will be a male or a female. On a rare occasion,
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tionale that pure eugenic statutes no longer had. An XYY male is a
male born with an extra Y chromosome. According to numerous
studies, XYY males were believed to commit many more violent
crimes, on the average, than the typical XY male. Results of this
research revealed that persons with an XYY chromosome structure
were as much as 240 times more likely to be found among prison
populations as they were among the general populace. 2 Subsequent
studies,58 however, have refuted these findings and left the empirical
data for punitive sterilization statutes as sparse as it is for eugenic
sterilization statutes.
The judiciary's response to sterilization cases that have involved
punitive sterilization statutes has been cyclical, rather than evincing
a definite trend. For instance, in the seminal case of Skinner v.
Oklahoma,"' the United States Supreme Court invalidated
Oklahoma's sterilization statute which provided for the sterilization
by "vasectomy"15  or "salpingectomy"" of "habitual criminals.
57
however, the process of fertilization by the male sperm of the female ovum mis-
functions and a fetus is created which contains chromosomal abnormalities. If
the male gonosomes receive an additional Y chromosome (i.e. an extra "male"
chromosome) the XYY or so-called "super male" is created. Such individuals
tend to be much taller than average, and often have an acne condition of the
skin. Statistically, it is believed that a "super male" occurs approximately once
in every 1000 male births. Recent studies seem to indicate that such individuals
tend to be more aggressive than most, and an unusually high percentage of crim-
inal conduct has been observed. Perhaps the most well-known modern carrier of
the XYY deviation was Richard Speck, convicted of murdering eight nurses in
Chicago in 1966.
Taylor, supra note 49, at 62-63.
52. Numerous studies conducted in the sixties in both England and the United States
have conclusively shown that there is a much higher incidence rate of XYY males among
prison populations than among the general population. One group of researchers conducted a
study at Rampton and Moss Side maximum security institutions in England. The incidence
rate for XXY males at both institutions was 24%, 240 times higher than that which would be
statistically expected. Id. at 64.
53. A 1976 study on the relationship between genetic abnormality in males and aggres-
sion concluded that XYY males are not more likely to commit violent crimes than genetically
normal XY males. The study concluded that although there may be a correlation between
XYY males and criminal behavior, there is no demonstrated causal relationship. The definitive
study on XYY aggression has yet to be done. See Witkin, Mednick, Schulsinger, Bakkestrom,
Christiansen, Goodenough, Hirshhorn, Lundsteen, Owen, Philip, Rubin and Stocking, Crimi-
nality in XYY and XXY Men, 193 Sci. 547, 550 (1976) as cited in Taylor, supra note 49.
54. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
55. "Vasectomy" involves cutting the vas deferens in males. This operation, which can
be performed on an outpatient basis, requires about fifteen minutes to perform, and can be
done under local anesthesia. Despite there being almost a 20-30% chance of reversing the
operation, it is still considered irreversible.
56. "Salpingectomy" involves cutting the fallopian tubes in females. This procedure is
sometimes referred to as "tubal ligation" and it is considered irreversible, although there exists
an extremely remote chance that it can be reversed.
57. The Oklahoma legislature defined "habitual criminal" as "any person who has been
convicted two or more times, in Oklahoma or any other state, of felonies involving moral turpi-
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This invalidation occurred because the statute expressly excluded
certain offenses, such as embezzlement, from its scope and, there-
fore, the court ruled that it violated the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.58
Less than thirty years later, a similar statute in In re Cavitt,59
which was applicable to habitual criminals committed to the Bea-
trice Home for the Feeble-minded, was found to comport with the
equal protection clause. The feature which distinguished this statute
from the one in Skinner was that it did not mandate sterilization,
but instead only made sterilization a condition to being released
from the institution.
60
Despite the cyclical nature of these decisions, the judiciary has
exhibited an increased sensitivity to individual rights. This increased
sensitivity, coupled with the lack of social acceptance of either eu-
genic or punitive sterilization, has culminated in what has been
termed the therapeutic rationale for compulsory sterilization of men-
tally handicapped persons.
2. The Therapeutic Rationale.-Allegedly concerned with the
"best interests"'" of the patient, therapeutic sterilization statutes are
the first important development in the legal system's attempt to ade-
quately protect the constitutional rights"2 of a mentally handicapped
person facing the threat of compulsory sterilization. Many of these
statutes also provide that the best interests of society shall be consid-
ered when determining if sterilization is warranted. Unfortunately,
those statutes which exhibit a concern for societal interests tend to
subordinate the rights of the mentally disabled individual whenever
the interests of the person and the interests of society appear to be at
odds.63
tude. Curiously, the statute did not characterize embezzlement as a felony involving moral
turpitude, but did include "stealing chickens." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 173 (1935).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides that "[No] State shall deprive .. .any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
59. 157 N.W.2d 171 (Neb. 1968). The court in Cavitt spread a wide protective net over
the Nebraska sterilization statute, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-501 to 83-508 (1943), ruling that
the statute: I ) was a valid exercise of the police power; 2) did not deny equal protection of the
law as class legislation; 3) did not unlawfully delegate quasi-judicial powers to the board of
examiners of mentally disabled persons; and 4) afforded procedural due process. Moreover, the
court held that the term "mentally deficient" as used in the statute was not unconstitutionally
vague and indefinite, and that the operations sanctioned by the state, were not cruel and un-
usual punishment. 157 N.W.2d 171, 174-78 (Neb. 1968).
60. Id. at 171.
61. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
62. See infra note 112.
63. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-1 to 19 (1972) (uses best interests of patient and
society); cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. 35-36 to -50 (1976) (protects the "public good"). See also IDAHO
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The most heralded argument put forth in support of incorporat-
ing the best interests of society into a sterilization statute is that
mentally disabled persons are unfit to parent their offspring.64 This
would presumably result in not only an increased number of charges
to the welfare rolls, but also present hazards to the health and safety
of the offspring if permitted to stay with the mentally disabled par-
ent. This concern figured prominently in the North Carolina sterili-
zation statute.65 This statute requires only that there be a probability
that the mentally handicapped person could not care for his or her
children, asserting that there is no need to demonstrate this defi-
ciency before sterilization can be ordered.
This cavalier attitude in evaluating the best interests of society
can arguably be regarded as also representing the best interests of
the mentally impaired person.66 Yet some jurisdictions take a more
structured stance with regard to therapeutic sterilization, holding
that in order for compulsory sterilization to be in the best interests of
the mentally handicapped person certain requirements must be met.
Oregon's sterilization statute67 requires that:
CODE §§ 39-3901 to -3910 (1977) (can order sterilization if patient unfit to raise children).
But see OR. REV. STAT. §§ 436.205 to .335 (1983) (only considers the best interests of the
patient).
64. This concern is supported by various United States Supreme Court decisions which
have held that parents have a fundamental right to direct the care and activities of their chil-
dren. Quillion v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
65. NC. GEN. STAT. § 35-39(3) (1976) provides for the sterilization of a mentally dis-
abled person if, in the opinion of the person(s) bringing the sterilization petition (parent,
guardian, county director of social services, or other public official), a "resident of an institu-
tion, or non-institutional individual would be likely, unless sterilized, to procreate a child or
children who would have a tendency to serious physical, mental, or nervous disease or defi-
ciency which is not likely to materially improve, the person would be unable to care for a child
or children." The statute does not list any guidelines that should be considered in ascertaining
the mentally handicapped person's best interests, but instead leaves that determination solely
to the discretion of the petitioner.
66. This dubious assertion is apparently based on the circular argument that the men-
tally disabled person would benefit indirectly by living in a society with less social problems,
rather than a society filled with children who have mentally deficient, presumably unfit
parents.
67. The Utah legislature has mandated that a court considering the sterilization of a
mentally handicapped person must consider the following factors in ascertaining the best inter-
ests of the individual:
a) the nature and degree of mental impairment of the person and the likeli-
hood that the condition is permanent;
b) the level of understanding of the person regarding the concepts of repro-
duction and contraception and whether the ability of the person to understand
such concepts is likely to improve;
c) the capability of the person for procreation and reproduction. It is a re-
buttable presumption that the ability to procreate and reproduce exists in a per-
son of normal physical development;
d) the potentially injurious physical and psychological effects from steriliza-
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1) the individual is physically capable of procreating;
2) the individual is likely to engage in sexual activity at the
present time or in the near future under circumstances likely to
result in pregnancy;
3) all less drastic contraceptive measures, including supervi-
sion, education and training, have proved unworkable or inappli-
cable, or are medically counter-indicated;
4) the proposed method of sterilization conforms with stan-
dard medical practice, is the least intrusive method available
and appropriate, and can be carried out without reasonable risk
to the health and life of the individual; and
5) the nature and extent of the individual disability, as de-
termined by empirical evidence and not solely on the basis of
standardized tests, renders the individual permanently incapable
of caring for and raising a child, even with reasonable
assistance.68
Clearly, Oregon has gone much further in safeguarding the in-
terests of the individual than has North Carolina, by requiring that
those seeking to have a particular individual sterilized meet a signifi-
cantly higher burden of proof that such sterilization is warranted.
These five factors are deliberately directed toward viewing steriliza-
tion as a last resort, only to be used if all other alternatives would
leave the mentally handicapped person in a worse position than he
would have been in had he been sterilized.
The great variance among the statutory standards used in deter-
mining when compulsory sterilization is appropriate is surpassed
only by the variance among the judicial standards used in states
without sterilization statutes.69 This fact exemplifies the need for leg-
tion, pregnancy, childbirth and parenthood;
e) the alternative methods of birth control presently available including, but
not limited to, drugs, intrauterine devices, education and training, and the feasi-
bility of one or more of these methods as an alternative to sterilization;
) the likelihood that the person will engage in sexual activity or could be
sexually abused or exploited;
g) the method of sterilization which is medically advisable and the least
intrusive and destructive of the person's rights to bodily and psychological
integrity;
h) the advisability of postponing the procedure of sterilization until a later
date; and
i) the likelihood that the person could adequately care and provide for a
child.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-10-8 (Supp. 1975).
68. OR. REV. STAT. § 436.208 (1983).
69. Compare In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982) (parens patriae power
enabled court to hear sterilization case absent specific statutory authority) with Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 469 So.2d 588 (Ala. 1985) (court can not hear sterilization case without specific
statutory authority).
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islative guidance to assure that the constitutional rights of mentally
handicapped persons in compulsory sterilization cases are protected.
B. States without Sterilization Statutes - Various Jurisdictional
Bases
The majority of states do not have sterilization statutes,70
thereby leaving the decision of whether to sterilize a particular indi-
vidual entirely to the judiciary. Although many courts promulgate
standards to which they must adhere in order to grant a sterilization
petition, 71 these standards vary from state to state, 2 and even within
the states. 73 As a result, the constitutional rights of a mentally hand-
icapped person could very well be decided on the happenstance of
70. These states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Ha-
waii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mex-
ico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
71. See In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981); Cf. In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 228, 608
P.2d 635 (1980); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981). Accord Wentzel v. Mont-
gomery Gen. Hosp., Inc., 293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244 (1982). In Wentzel, the court agreed
with the C.D.M. court in requiring that courts ruling on sterilization cases must consider the
following factors:
I) Those advocating sterilization bear the heavy burden of proving by clear
and convincing evidence that sterilization is in the best interests of the
incompetent;
2) The incompetent must be afforded a full judicial hearing at which medical
testimony is presented and the incompetent, through a guardian ad litem, is al-
lowed to present proof and cross-examine witnesses;
3) The trial judge must be assured that a comprehensive medical, psychologi-
cal and social evaluation is made of the incompetent;
4) The trial judge must determine that the individual is legally incompetent to
make a decision whether to be sterilized and that this incapacity is in all likeli-
hood permanent;
5) The incompetent must be capable of reproduction and unable to care for the
offspring;
6) Sterilization must be the only practicable means of contraception;
7) The proposed operation must be the least restrictive alternative available;
8) To the extent possible, the trial court must hear testimony from the incom-
petent concerning his or her understanding and desire, if any, for the proposed
operation and its consequences; and finally,
9) The court must examine the motivation behind the petition.
293 Md. 685, 692-93, 447 A.2d 1244, 1248-49 (1982).
72. Compare In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981) (court promulgated standards
listed in supra note 71) with In re Hayes, 93 Wash.2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 -(1980) (court re-
quired additional standard that it be shown by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the
current state of medical and scientific knowledge does not suggest either; a) that a reversible
procedure or other less drastic contraceptive method will shortly be available; or b) that sci-
ence is on the threshold of an advance in the treatment of the individual's disability).
73. Compare In re Johnson, 45 N.C. App. 649, 263 S.E.2d 805 (1980) (court reasoned
that it had equity power to hear sterilization cases) with In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d
307 (1976) (court held that it had no inherent power to order sterilization).
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which court is chosen to consider the sterilization petition.
The question of which standards control in a given sterilization
case is, however, often rendered moot since the overwhelming major-
ity of courts in states without sterilization statutes hold that the
court has no jurisdiction to hear sterilization cases absent specific
statutory authority.7 ' Even in states that have sterilization statutes,75
it is not uncommon for a court to rule that a particular statute does
not apply to a given set of circumstances. Thus, courts are often con-
fronted with the issue of whether the court has jurisdiction to rule on
a sterilization petition in the absence of a controlling statute.76 The
leading Pennsylvania case addressing the sterilization of the men-
tally disabled, In re Terwilliger,7 is among the minority of decisions
which hold that a court does have jurisdiction absent specific legisla-
tion.78 This jurisdiction has been found to reside in various places,
among them the common law doctrine of parens patriae,79 and the
court's inherent power as an equity court.8"
74. Maxon v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 626, 185 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1982). See
also supra note 40.
75. See s upra note 41.
76. Delaware has a sterilization statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 5701-05, yet the
Delaware Chancery Court in In re S.C.E., 378 A.2d 144 (Del. Ch. 1977) chose to ignore it,
declaring that the statute was inapplicable to the particular facts of the case.
77. 304 Pa. Super. 553, 450 A.2d 1376 (1982).
78. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp.
1383 (M.D. Ala. 1974); In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981); Wentzel v. Montgomery
Gen. Hosp., 293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244 (1982); In re Moe, 385 Mass. App. 555, 432 N.E.2d
712 (1982); In re Penny, 120 N.H. 269, 414 A.2d 541 (1980); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426
A.2d 467 (1981); In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 295, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1976); In re Hayes, 93
Wash. 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980); In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981).
79. Patens Patriae literally means "parent of the country," and it has numerous applica-
tions in the law beyond the bounds of courts' jurisdiction to hear sterilization cases. For a
discussion of the parens patriae doctrine as it applies to the area of medical decision-making
for children, see D. Kearney, Parental Failure to Provide Child with Medical Assistance
Based on Religious Beliefs Causing Child's Death - Involuntary Manslaughter in Pennsyl-
vania, 90 DICK. L. REV. 861 (1986).
80. The courts' power as an equity court to hear sterilization cases is derived from juris-
dictional statutes granting them general authority. It is commendable that the judiciary has
extended its jurisdictional limits in an effort to provide the mentally handicapped with a forum
through which they can pursue their right to choose sterilization, yet, such an extension is
unnecessary when the legislature could provide jurisdiction through a comprehensive steriliza-
tion statute. See generally B. Burnett, Voluntary Sterilization for Persons with Mental Disa-
bilities: The Need for Legislation, 32 SYRACUSE L. REV. 913 (1981). For an example of a
statute providing general authority to a court, see OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2101.24 (Balwin
1960). See, e.g., In re Simpson, 180 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962) (construed OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2102.24 in recognizing jurisdiction to order sterilization). Contra In re
Eberhardy, 97 Wis.2d 654, 294 N.W.2d 540 (1980) af'd 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881
(1981) (refused to construe statute as granting authority to hear sterilization case). The Wis-
consin Court of Appeals in Eberhardy urged that if it authorized jurisdiction to hear steriliza-
tion cases absent a specific sterilization statute, it would have to operate in a "standard-less
[sic] vaccuum . . . or create standards (for sterilization cases] without the benefit of legislative
guidance." 97 Wis. at 665, 294 N.W.2d at 547.
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I. Parens Patriae.-The common law doctrine of "parens pa-
triae" provides that courts are vested with the inherent equitable au-
thority of the sovereign to protect those persons within the state who
can not protect themselves due to a legal disability. In the case of a
mentally handicapped person, the court would be protecting the indi-
vidual from either his parents or his legal guardian.8 It is alleged
that such protection is needed since the parents or guardian do not
necessarily have the best interests of the individual in mind, but may
instead be seeking to sterilize the individual for their own selfish rea-
sons.82 This assertion further advances the claim that specific sterili-
zation legislation is needed in Pennsylvania, because a court can
choose not to invoke jurisdiction under any legal theory.83 This
would leave the mentally disabled person without any mechanism
through which to choose sterilization.84 The lack of specific legisla-
tion also allows for conflicting decisions within states, thereby sub-
jecting the mentally disabled person's constitutional rights to the ca-
price of inconsistent case law.
Such inconsistency was the precise result in New York in the
mid-seventies. The New York Supreme Court in In re Sallmaier"
held that a court could exercise its parens patriae power to order a
sterilization where the mentally handicapped person is unable to give
informed consent, and conversely, unable to withhold it.8" This rul-
ing stands in sharp contrast to the New York Surrogate Court deci-
sion in In re D.D.,87 rendered only a year after Sallmaier. The D.D.
court expressly rejected the parens patriae doctrine as a basis for
authorizing sterilizations, holding that it could not rule on a compul-
81. This statement may appear counter-intuitive, but many courts have recognized that
the sterilization decision belongs to the mentally handicapped individual, not the individual's
parents or guardian. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 469 So.2d 588 (Alaska 1985); see also
infra note 82.
82. The Washington Supreme Court noted that "unlike the situation of a normal and
necessary medical procedure, in the question of sterilization the interests of the parents of the
retarded person can not be presumed to be identical to those of the child." In re Hayes, 93
Wash. 2d 228, 236, 608 P.2d 635, 460 (1980).
83. See cases cited supra note 40.
84. See generally Note, In re Guardianship of Eberhardy, The Sterilization of the
Mentally Retarded, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 1199.
85. 85 Misc. 2d 295, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1976). The mentally handicapped woman in
Sallmaier had suffered brain damage as a child, resulting in her having an IQ of 62. Despite
this limitation, she had a job and was surprisingly articulate. The court granted the steriliza-
tion, however, apparently motivated by a desire to lessen her parents' burden.
86. Id. at 297. The Sallmaier court opined that the parens patriae power must primarily
"balance the individual's right to be free from interference against the individual's need to be
treated."
87. 90 Misc. 2d 236, 394 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sur. Ct. 1977).
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sory sterilization case absent specific authority.8"
Other courts, not completely satisfied with the parens patriae
doctrine as the sole basis for authorizing sterilizations,89 have occa-
sionally invoked their general equity power through the liberal inter-
pretation of a general grant of authority to the court.
2. General Equitable Powers of the Court.-The only case
considered by the United States Supreme Court that addresses the
question of whether a court has jurisdiction to hear sterilization
cases pursuant to a broad statutory grant of authority was the semi-
nal case of Stump v. Sparkman." The precise issue in Sparkman
was whether a judge was protected by judicial immunity when he
acted in excess of his judicial authority in ordering the sterilization
of a mentally handicapped person.91 Judge Stump had approved a
petition for sterilization of a "somewhat retarded" fifteen-year old
girl. This order took place in an ex parte proceeding and without a
hearing. The girl received no notice of the proceeding nor was a
guardian appointed for her. The sterilization took place shortly
thereafter under the guise of an appendectomy.92
In deciding the Sparkman case, Justice White relied on the
early common law case of Bradley v. Fisher" and urged that a judge
should not be deprived of immunity simply because he was in error,
or because he acted maliciously, or even because he acted in excess
of his authority. 9 Indeed, the Court held that the only circumstance
which justifies stripping a judge of immunity would be where he has
acted in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." 95 Finding that the
Indiana court had jurisdiction to consider sterilization petitions
under the Indiana statute granting it broad general jurisdiction," the
Court in effect sanctioned Judge Stump's actions and granted the
88. Id. at 277, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
89. See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 369 F. Supp. 1383 (M.D. Ala. 1974). See also In re Terwil-
liger, 304 Pa. Super. 553, 450 A.2d 1376 (1982) (court used both parens patriae power and
general equitable power of court to authorize sterilization).
90. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
91. Id. at 355.
92. Id. at 351-54. About two years after the operation, the girl (Linda Spitler) was
married to Leo Sparkman. After numerous attempts to have a child, the Sparkman's discov-
ered that Linda had been sterilized.
93. 13 Wall. 335 (1872) (seminal case establishing exception to judicial immunity).
94. 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978).
95. Id. at 357.
96. IND. CODE § 33-4-4-3 (1975) provides in pertinent part that the "[circuit] court
shall have original exclusive jurisdiction in all cases at law and equity whatsoever, . . except
where exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction is, or may be conferred by law on the Justice of the
Peace. It shall also have exclusive jurisdiction of . . .guardianships."
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immunity.
The judicial abuse of the rights of mentally disabled persons as
evidenced in Sparkman, 97 in addition to the vagaries of inconsistent
treatment of those same rights as revealed by Sallmaier 98 and In re
D.D.,99 jointly pose a compelling argument for legislative guidance in
Pennsylvania regarding the sterilization of the mentally handi-
capped. This argument is further buttressed by Pennsylvania's judi-
cial response in In re Terwilliger,'"0 which combined the parens pa-
triae power and the general equitable powers of the court to
authorize jurisdiction over compulsory sterilization cases.
3. Pennsylvania's Judicial Response: In re Terwilliger.-The
issue in Terwilliger of whether the orphans' court had jurisdiction to
hear sterilization cases absent specific statutory authority was one of
first impression in the Commonwealth. Judge Popovich, relying on a
tenuous construction of the court's guardianship powers10 1 and its
general grant of authority, 102 maintained that the orphans' division
of the court of common pleas was the proper forum in which a
guardian could bring a petition for the sterilization of a mentally
handicapped person.' 0 '
Having settled this preliminary issue, the Terwilliger court au-
thorized jurisdiction under the parens patriae power as derived from
its general equitable powers.104 This "hybrid" approach' 0 5 displays
97. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 85-6 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
100. 304 Pa. Super. 553, 450 A.2d 1376 (1982).
101. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 712 (Purdon 1974) provides that "[tihe jurisdiction of
the court of common pleas over the following may be exercised through the orphans' court
division: ...(2) Guardian of Person. The appointment, control and removal of the guardian
of the person of any incompetent."
102. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 323 (Purdon 1978) provides that:
Every court shall have the power to issue, under its judicial seal, every law-
ful writ and process necessary or suitable for the exercise of its jurisdiction and
for the enforcement of any order which it may make and all legal and equitable
powers required for or incidental to the exercise of its jurisdiction, and, except as
otherwise prescribed by general rules, every court shall have the power to make
such rules and order of the court as the interest of justice or the business of the
court may require.
103. 304 Pa. Super. 553, 563, 450 A.2d 1376, 1383 (1982).
104. The Terwilliger court observed that the courts' parens patriae power has been de-
scribed as "plenary and potent to afford whatever relief may be necessary to protect [the
mentally handicapped person's] interests." Id. at 561, 450 A.2d at 1381 quoting 27 AM. JUR.
2d Equity 69 at 592 (1969). Judge Popovich, having noted that the parens patriae doctrine
empowered the court to hear the case, "acknowledged the existence of a statutory scheme ...
delineating the scope of authority and power vested in our unified court system to address and
remedy such an issue as [sterilizing the mentally handicapped]. 304 Pa. Super. at 563, 450
A.2d at 1381-82.
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Pennsylvania's concern for providing mentally disabled persons with
a method for exercising their constitutional right to choose steriliza-
tion. This legitimate concern should be supported by a comprehen-
sive sterilization statute, instead of forcing the courts to perform le-
gal gymnastics in order to hear sterilization cases.
IV. Constitutional Considerations
The decline of eugenics as a rationale for compulsory steriliza-
tion of the mentally handicapped has been paralleled by a dramatic
increase in the level of scrutiny that must be given to compulsory
sterilization statutes. When Buck v. Bell' 6 was decided, the state
was only required to prove that the Virginia Sterilization Act was
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 0 7 At that time, how-
ever, the right to procreate was not considered a fundamental
right. 10 8 This changed in 1942 when the United States Supreme
Court decided the case of Skinner v. Oklahoma,0 9 and in doing so
established the right to procreate as a fundamental right.1' 0 Follow-
ing the decision in Skinner, the level of constitutional scrutiny also
changed from the easily met "rational basis""' test to the signifi-
cantly more rigorous standard of "strict scrutiny."' 2 Under the ae-
gis of strict scrutiny, any compulsory sterilization statute that pur-
ports to have a significant impact on a specific class of persons, must
now be supported by a showing that the classification is necessary in
order to advance a compelling state interest."'
105. This hybrid approach also reveals the court's uncertainty in reposing jurisdiction to
hear sterilization cases on either the parens patriae doctrine or the court's general grant of
authority alone. Such uncertainty could be eliminated by the enactment of a comprehensive
sterilization statute that incorporates the constitutional rights of the mentally handicapped
person.
106. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
107. Id. at 207.
108. Fundamental rights have been characterized as "basic civil rights of man." Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The protection of fundamental rights was paramount
at the time of the Skinner decision, due in large part to America's awareness of the Nazi
atrocities during World War II. This was especially true of the rights of marriage and procrea-
tion which the Skinner court wisely recognized as "fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race." Id. at 541.
109. Id. at 535.
110. Id. at 541.
I11. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Justice Holmes urged that the rational basis test had
been met since "the general declarations of the legislature" (i.e., that mental incompetence
was inherited) and the "specific findings of the court" (i.e., that Carrie Buck was mentally
incompetent and would have similarly afflicted children) "justify the result" (i.e., that Carrie
should be sterilized).
112. For cases using the strict scrutiny/compelling state interest test, see. e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
113. See, e.g., Brode v. Brode, 278 S.C. 457, 298 S.E.2d 443 (1982).
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The right to choose sterilization would appear to be a corollary
to the right to procreate, 1 4 since the right to do something (i.e., to
procreate) only has meaning if it also implies the right not to do the
particular act (i.e., to choose sterilization). Yet, the United States
Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether the right to
choose sterilization is indeed a fundamental right, although numer-
ous state and federal courts have ruled that it is.11 5 When the United
States Supreme Court does address the issue, there is ample reason
to believe that it will be considered a fundamental right which is
derived from the right to privacy.
A. The Right to Choose Sterilization as Derived from the Right to
Privacy
The right to privacy is not one of the enumerated rights granted
by the Constitution. 16 It arises instead from the very nature and
purpose of the Constitution, an abiding sense of "liberty" as that
term is used in the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment,11 7 and from the penumbras" 8 of the fifth 9 and ninth amend-
ments. 120 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in Doe v. Bol-
ton,1 21 observed that the right to privacy also arises from the
privileges and immunities clause of article IV.1 22 Numerous other
fundamental rights are derived from the right to privacy, such as the
right to have an abortion, 12  and the right of married1 4 and unmar-
114. See supra note 84.
115. See Hathaway v. Worchester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701 (Ist Cir. 1973); Ruby v.
Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978); North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451 (M.D.N.C. 1976); Reif v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196
(D.D.C. 1974); In re Tulley, 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1978), cert. denied sub.
orn. Tulley v. Tulley, 440 U.S. 967 (1979); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974); In re
Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981); Ponter v. Ponter, 135 N.J. Super. 50, 342 A.2d 574
(1975); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980).
116. Examples of enumerated rights are the right to free speech (first amendment), the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures (fourth amendment), and the right to
a jury trial (seventh amendment).
117. "No State shall ...deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2.
118. Penumbra literally means a "margin or partial shadow." NEW STANDARD Dic-
TIONARY 1831 (16th ed. 1947). The concept of penumbras is used to characterize the origin of
rights that are implicit in the Constitution.
119. "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
120. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
121. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
122. "The Citizens of each state shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of the
several states." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. I.
123. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
124. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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ried persons, 115 and even minors,"' to use contraceptives. These
rights are closely associated with the right to choose sterilization
since they all concern an individual's freedom to exercise control
over his or her body.
127
In the landmark case of Roe v. Wade,12 8 Justice Blackmun ex-
tended the right to privacy to include the right to have an abortion.
The Court, recognizing that a woman's right to terminate her preg-
nancy is fundamental, devised a system for measuring the level of
state interest that accompanies each successive stage of preg-
nancy.'2 9 The Court asserted that at the point of fetal viability,3 0
the state's interest in regulating the mother's right to terminate her
pregnancy becomes compelling. Thus, at this stage an abortion can
be performed only if it is necessary to save the mother's life or pre-
serve her health. It would be more difficult to locate a compelling
state interest in the decision to choose sterilization than in the deci-
sion to terminate a pregnancy because in the former no "life in be-
ing""'s' enters into the equation.
Unlike the right to have an abortion, the right to use contracep-
tives deals with preventing a woman from becoming pregnant, and
thus is more analogous to the right to choose sterilization. The Court
in Griswold v. Connecticut13 2 held that a statute prohibiting the use
of contraceptives by married persons violated the right of marital
privacy as guaranteed in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights.' 33
Given the decisions in both Roe v. Wade and Griswold, the various
state and federal decisions holding that the right to choose steriliza-
tion is a fundamental right, appear to be on firm ground. 3
The right to choose sterilization extends to both mentally handi-
capped and non-mentally handicapped persons under the equal pro-
125. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (court extended right to use contracep-
tives to unmarried persons on equal protection grounds).
126. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
127. See supra note 84.
128. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
129. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, (1973), the court engineered a "sliding scale" for
pinpointing the level of state interest that corresponds to a particular event in a pregnant
woman's gestation period. The court noted that "[w]ith respect to the State's important and
legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the 'compelling' point, in light of present medi-
cal knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester." Id. at 163. However, "[w]ith
respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'compelling' point
is at viability." Id. Thus, the state may not regulate the abortion decision within the first three
months of a woman's pregnancy.
130. "Viability" means that the fetus is capable of living outside the womb. Id. at 164.
131. "Life in being" is used in the sense that it concerns life during the gestation period.
132. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
133. Id. at 481-86.
134. See supra note 115.
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tection clause of the fourteenth amendment." 5 Yet the majority of
compulsory sterilization statutes that have been found to be constitu-
tionally infirm have been invalidated for failure to provide equal
protection. 136
B. Equal Protection
Equal protection problems in sterilization statutes arise under
two distinct scenarios: 1) between institutionalized and non-institu-
tionalized persons; and 2) between mentally handicapped, potentially
unfit parents and non-mentally handicapped, potentially unfit par-
ents. 137 Just as the states must show a compelling state interest in
denying a mentally handicapped person the right to choose steriliza-
tion, the state must also show a compelling state interest in order to
sterilize that individual. Historically, this interest was found in the
eugenic rationale for sterilizing the mentally handicapped, although
at the time of Buck v. Bell the state interest only needed to be legiti-
mate, not compelling.
Current advocates of the sterilization of the mentally handi-
capped identify the compelling state interest as being the need to
secure the welfare of minor children. 138 This is a valid state concern,
and because it addresses the health and safety of children, it would
not be exceedingly difficult to categorize it as compelling. The prob-
lem with this rationale arises, however, because a number of compul-
sory sterilization statutes only apply to institutionalized mentally
handicapped persons. 13 '9 Thus, not only must the statute show that
sterilizing mentally handicapped persons would further a compelling
state interest, but it must further prove that applying the law only to
institutionalized persons serves a compelling state interest.""
As noted, Justice Holmes summarily disposed of the equal pro-
tection claim in Buck v. Bell"" by asserting that so long as there is
an ongoing effort to channel all of the state's mentally handicapped
persons through the institution, then the law applies equally to all
135. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, I.
136. See supra note 24.
137. Sherlock, supra note 9, at 959.
138. The North Carolina legislature targeted the welfare of children as the justification
for sterilizing mentally handicapped "unfit parents." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-39(3) (1976); GA.
CODE ANN. § 84-931-36 (1975); IDAHO CODE § 39-3901-10 (1977).
139. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-47-10 to -47-100 (Law Co-op. 1977).
140. Sherlock, supra note 9, at 953-63.
141. 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
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mentally handicapped persons within the state.'42 As weak an argu-
ment as it was then, it is even weaker now since states no longer
endeavor to "process" all their mentally disabled persons through
their institutions, but instead encourage them to live in the commu-
nity and become self-reliant.1" 3
Struggling with the same issue in Ruby v. Massey,"" the court
maintained that "[i]f the state may rationally decide to sterilize
some individuals to avoid incomprehensible pregnancy, it makes
shamefully limited sense that the same right should be denied to
others in the same situation."" 5 It is clear that any compulsory ster-
ilization statute, if it is to survive an equal protection attack, must
apply to both institutionalized and non-institutionalized persons.
The second distinction that raises equal protection problems is
that not all unfit parents are mentally handicapped. This invites
equal protection attacks on the basis of underinclusiveness, 14 since
there is no state interest in promoting a sterilization statute which
would permit the sterilization of potentially unfit mentally handi-
capped parents, while excluding potentially unfit non-mentally hand-
icapped parents. This is especially true if the entire basis for finding




In addition to withstanding an equal protection claim, a com-
pulsory sterilization statute must also provide substantive and proce-
dural due process. This requirement can easily be met by mandating
that the decision of whether to sterilize a particular mentally handi-
capped person be left for the courts to decide. Yet, there are statutes
that do not require judicial intervention," 8 but instead allow a non-
judicial panel comprised of medical experts and sometimes hospital
superintendents to decide whether to recommend sterilization. These
panels have full power to decide the sterilization issue on the merits,
and only after the decision is made is the ruling subjected to judicial
142. Id.
143. Sherlock, supra note 9, at 961.
144. 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978).
145. Id. at 368.
146. "Underinclusiveness" means that the class of persons to whom a given statute ap-
plies is identical in all relevant respects to another class of persons to whom the statute does
not apply.
147. See supra note 138.
148. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-1 to -19 (1972).
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appellate review. 49 Some state statutes actually permit the panel to
order sterilization without any judicial intervention whatsoever.150
Those statutes that do not permit judicial review in the first instance
run the risk of violating the modern constitutional standard that
"deprivation of a fundamental right is not a power delegable to a
non-judicial review board in the first instance." 5 Therefore, any
compulsory sterilization statute that has a respect for the due pro-
cess rights of mentally handicapped persons should provide for judi-
cial review in the first instance.
The ultimate purpose behind this Comment is to suggest guide-
lines that can be used when considering the sterilization of mentally
handicapped persons to ensure their constitutional rights. The pro-
posed act is based on viable social theories founded on sound empiri-
cal data, and also avoids the attendant problems of leaving the steril-
ization decision entirely to the judiciary.
V. Proposed Sterilization Act for Pennsylvania
A. Legislative Purpose
The purpose of this Act is to provide mentally handicapped per-
sons existing in the Commonwealth a lawful method through which
they can exercise their constitutional right of procreative choice and
avoid the abuses of unregulated sterilization practices. This Act also
seeks to ensure that no sterilization will be performed on any men-
tally handicapped person:
a) against the individual's expressed wishes;
b) against the individual's implied wishes; or
c) in the absence of the ability on the part of the mentally
handicapped person to communicate his wishes regarding sterili-
zation, either expressly or implied, then the sterilization will be
performed only if it would be in the "best interests" of the men-
tally handicapped person as that term is defined under sec. B(1).
149. The Mississippi statute provides in part that -[after the notice required ... shall
have been so given, the board of trustees of mental institutions . . . shall proceed to hear and
consider the sterilization petition and the evidence offered in support of and against the same."
Id. at § 41-45-7.
150. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, 5701 (1974).
151. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 724,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
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B. Definitions
All terms defined in this section shall be so defined for purposes
of this Act unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.
1. "Best interests"1 52 means that:
(a) the individual is physically capable of procreating;
(b) the individual is likely to engage in sexual activity at
the present time or in the near future under circumstances likely
to result in pregnancy;
(c) all less drastic contraceptive methods, including supervi-
sion, education and training, have proved unworkable or inappli-
cable, or are medically counter-indicated;
(d) the proposed method of sterilization conforms with
standard medical practice, is the least intrusive method available
and appropriate, and can be carried out without unreasonable
risk to the life and health of the individual; and
(e) the nature and extent of the individual's disability, as
determined by empirical evidence and not solely on the basis of
standardized tests, renders the individual permanently incapable
of caring for and raising a child, even with reasonable
assistance.
2. "Mentally handicapped" means that the individual has been
determined to be mentally handicapped by a licensed physician qual-
ified to make such determinations, provided that the physician:
(a) is not related to the individual under determination;
(b) has no real or colorable interest in whether the individ-
ual is found to be mentally handicapped; and
(c) has no real or colorable interest in whether the individ-
ual is sterilized.
3. "Existing in the Commonwealth" shall be the appropriate
characterization of any mentally handicapped person as defined
under sec. B(2) of the Act who:
(a) resides in the state; or
(b) would be physically within the state during the pro-
posed time for the sterilization.
4. "Express wishes" means any expression that reasonably com-
municates the mentally handicapped person's intention to not have
the sterilization performed that is expressed:
152. The author has incorporated Oregon's definition of "best interests" into the pro-
posed statute. See OR. REV. STAT. § 436.205(1) (1983).
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(a) verbally; or
(b) in writing.
5. "Implied wishes" means any expression made by the handi-
capped person that reasonably communicates his intention to not
have the sterilization performed that is not listed under sec. B(4),
including but not limited to:
(a) physical behavior, such as hostility; or
(b) an abrupt change in the individual's typical behavior
pattern that can be reasonably attributed to having been in-
formed of the potential sterilization.
6. "Sterilization"'15 3 means any medical procedure, treatment or
operation for the purpose of rendering an individual permanently in-
capable of procreating.
C. Subject Classes
This statute shall apply to both institutionalized and non-insti-
tutionalized mentally handicapped persons provided they qualify as a
mentally handicapped person under sec. B(2) & (3).
D. Procedures for Judicial Approval
1. In order to sterilize a mentally handicapped person under this
Act, the person(s) seeking such sterilization shall bring a steriliza-
tion petition in a court of competent jurisdiction.
2. After D(l) has been complied with, the court shall appoint a
guardian ad litem who shall then be the only person eligible to pur-
sue the sterilization petition throughout the remainder of the judicial
process, including all subsequent appellate proceedings, if any.
E. Notice Requirement
Those persons seeking to have a particular mentally handi-
capped person sterilized must provide notice to that individual or his
legal guardian. This must take place before the court is empowered
to hear the merits of the case.
F. Hearing Requirement
A hearing shall take place to evaluate the merits of the case to
ascertain whether there is a "strong likelihood" that the guardian
153. The author has adopted Oregon's definition of "sterilization." See OR. REV. STAT. §
436.205(4) (1983).
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will be able to present clear and convincing evidence that such steril-
ization would be in the best interests of the mentally handicapped
person.
G. Appellate Review
The losing party shall have the right to appeal an adverse deci-
sion through all appropriate levels of the Pennsylvania court system,
including the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and shall also have the
right to apply for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
H. Annual Review Board
This Act shall commission an annual review board to review
and update the policies and procedures established pursuant to this
Act. The Board shall meet on the first Monday in October of each
year, and consist of members appointed by the Legislative Assembly.
The Board's report shall be sent to the Legislative Assembly no later
than November 15 of the year in which the report was generated,
and shall suggest changes to the standards and procedures outlined
in this Act after a complete analysis of all the sterilization cases that
have been decided pursuant to this Act within the preceding year.
VI. Conclusion
Mentally handicapped persons in Pennsylvania occupy an
unenviable position. Like other disenfranchised minorities, they must
constantly struggle for assurance of their constitutional rights, yet
unlike other minorities their disability often renders them incapable
of realizing when these rights are being jeopardized. This excep-
tional vulnerability places a duty on Pennsylvania to provide a lawful
mechanism through which mentally handicapped persons can exer-
cise their right to choose sterilization. The experience of New York
and other states demonstrates the inconsistent treatment that can re-
sult from leaving the entire issue of sterilization solely to the judici-
ary. Pennsylvania needs a comprehensive sterilization statute that
adequately assures mentally handicapped persons their constitutional
rights while simultaneously avoiding the problems that attend unreg-
ulated sterilization practices.
Richard A. Estacio
